Organization, Tactics, and Weapons of the Russian Army

(From Vostochnaya Voina 1853-1856 godov, by Lieutenant General M. I. Bogdanovich. 2nd edition, St. Petersburg, 1877. Vol. 1, Appendix, pages 8-19.)


The regular Russian army was divided into active forces [deistvuyushchiya voiska] which existed in peacetime and strengthened in numbers at the beginning of wartime, and reserves [rezervnyya voiska] which had only small cadres in peacetime and which were formed upon the onset of a war. With the reserve forces it is necessary to include special replacement [zapasnyya] units which were also formed in wartime.

a) Active forces consisted of corps: the Guards Infantry Corps, Guards Reserve Cavalry Corps, Grenadier Corps, six Infantry Corps numbered 1st through 6th, and the 1st and 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps. Besides these, there were independent corps: Separate Caucasus Corps, Separate Orenburg Corps, Separate Siberia Corps, training and educational forces, etc.

The Guards and Grenadier Corps were subordinate to a special commander. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Infantry Corps made up the so-called Active Army [deistvuyushchaya armiya] which was under the command of General-Field Marshal Prince Paskevich. The 5th and 6th Infantry Corps were under the Minister of War and termed separate corps. The 1st and 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps were subordinate to their own Inspector of Reserve Cavalry.

The Guards Corps consisted of three divisions, each of four regiments made up of three battalions, and a rifle battalion and sapper battalion, making 38 battalion in all. It also had a light cavalry division containing 32 squadrons.

Each infantry corps also consisted of three infantry divisions, a light cavalry division, a rifle battalion, and a sapper battalion. With the Guards Infantry Divison were also the battalion of the Guards Equipage [naval battalion] and some other units.

The Guards Reserve Cavalry Corps, not counting cossacks, was made up of one cuirassier division, two light cavalry divisions, and the Life-Guards Horse-Pioneer Double-Squadron [Divizion]. The 1st Reserve Cavalry Corps consisted of two cuirassier divisions and a reserve lancer division, while the 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps was made up of two dragoon divisions.

This organization into corps and divisions existed in wartime as well as in peace, but during wartime these corps and divisions were put together into armies according to specific HIGHEST orders, dependent on the course of military events. Such was the case in the Eastern War when the Guards Reserve Corps was formed from reserve units of the Guards, and the Baltic Corps was formed from the 2nd Infantry Division and two reserve brigades of the 1st Corps.

Each infantry division had two brigades, and each brigade - two regiments. In the Guards and Grenadier divisions the first brigades were made up of two grenadier regiments and the second - of one grenadier regiment and one carabineer regiment. In the six infantry corps the first brigades were made up of infantry regiments while the second brigades had jäger regiments (1).

Infantry regiments in the six infantry corps had four battalions each. Each battalion consisted of four companies: one grenadier or carabineer, and three jäger (fusilier in the Grenadier Corps) or musketeer. A company numbered 250 men. Rifle battalions also consisted of four companies, but each company was of 180 men (2).

Each cavalry division consisted of two brigades - one lancer and one hussar. A brigade was made up of two regiments. Guards light cavalry divisions were made up of various regiments.

Each cavalry regiment was made up as follows: in the Guards Corps - of six squadrons, each squadron of 150 men; in the 1st and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions - six 170-man squadrons; in the Reserve Lancer Division and seven light cavalry divisions - eight 170-man squadrons; and in army dragoon regiments - 10 squadrons each of 170 men. The Life-Guards Horse-Pioneer Double-squadron and the 1st Horse-Pioneer Double-squadron each consisted of two 250-man squadrons.

The guards artillery consisted of three foot guard artillery brigades and the Life-Guards Horse Artillery. Each foot guards artillery brigade had two heavy [batareinaya] batteries and one light battery, but in 1854 fourth batteries were formed consisting of eight lightened 12-pounder guns (3). The Life-Guards Horse Artillery consisted of one heavy and four light batteries. The artillery divisions of the Grenadier Corps and each of the six infantry corps had three foot artillery brigades, one horse-artillery brigade, and one park brigade (of three mobile and one flying park).

In each grenadier artillery brigade there were four batteries: two heavy and two light, but in 1854 fifth light batteries were added (4). Each of the field foot brigades also had four batteries, with the 1st Brigade of each of the divisions having two heavy and two light batteries, while the other two brigades each had one heavy and three light.

In each artillery division the batteries had sequential numbers in the following manner:

1st Brigade: Heavy No. 1 and No. 2 Batteries.
                   Light No. 1 and No. 2 Batteries.

2nd Brigade: Heavy No. 3 Battery.
                   Light No. 3, No. 4, and No. 5 Batteries.

3rd Brigade: Heavy No. 4 Battery.
                   Light No. 6, No. 7, and No. 8 Batteries (5).

Horse-artillery brigades consisted of two light batteries.

Horse-artillery divisions with reserve cavalry corps were not divided into brigades and each was made up of two heavy and four light batteries.

All field foot batteries had 12 guns, but guards and grenadier foot batteries and all horse batteries had 8 guns: in heavy foot batteries - six 12-pounder cannons and six 18-pounder unicorns [½ pud. edinorogi]; in light foot batteries - eight 6-pounder cannons and four 9-pounder unicorns; in heavy horse-artillery batteries - eight 18-pounder unicorns; in light horse-artillery batteries - four 6-pounder cannons and four 9-pounder unicorns.

There were 350 men in each park company of mobile and flying parks.

Sapper battalions had four companies, each of 250 men.

In addition to the Life-Guards Sapper Battalion, Grenadier Sapper Battalion, and the six sapper battalions belonging to the six infantry corps, there were also the 1st and 2nd Reserve Sapper Battalions, each made up of four companies - one sapper and three pontoon. Each of the pontoon companies had a pontoon park. When units were brought to wartime strength, pontoon companies with their parks were assigned as needed to the infantry corps with the corresponding number.

Each of the six pontoon parks was made up of 32 canvas pontoons and 15 Birageau (wooden) pontoons. Additionally, there were other pontoon parks with: 1) the two horse-pioneer double-squadrons, each of 16 leather pontoon boats with their decking and trestle box, and 2) the Guards Equipage, of 60 Birageau pontoons.

Train [Furshtatskiya] brigades were divided into battalions according to the number of divisions in the corps, but did not have a separate organization. Rather, they were comprised of the non-combatant companies of infantry and cavalry regiments and the non-combatant sections of sapper and rifle battalions and of artillery batteries. These companies and sections stayed with their units and only nominally formed a battalion for each division and a brigade for each corps.

In this manner the total wartime strength of the active army by regulation tables of organization, not counting separate corps and line battalions, was as follows:



Guards Corps

38 battalions 38,000
Grenadier Corps 38 battalions 38,000
Six infantry Corps 300 battalions 300,000
Reserve sapper battalions 2 battalions 2,000
                         Total: 378 battalions 378,000      men



Guards cavalry

68 squadrons 9,000
7 light cavalry divisions 224 squadrons 38,080
1st Reserve Cavalry Corps:

1st Cuirassier Div.

2nd Cuirassier Div.

Reserve Lancer Div.


24 squadrons

24 squadrons

32 squadrons




2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps, of two dragoon divisions.:

 80 squadrons


Two horse-pioneer double-sqdns. 4 squadrons 1,000
               Total: 456 squadrons 75,280  men



Guards foot (6)

12 batteries 96 guns 2,264
Guards horse 5 batteries 40 guns 1,138
Grenadier Corps:

Foot (7)


15 batteries

2 batteries

120 guns

16 guns



Field artillery:





72 batteries

12 batteries

9 batteries


864 guns

96 guns

72 guns




To horse-artillery divisions with the rerserve cavalry corps:

12 batteries


96 guns


              Total: 139 batteries 1,400 guns 31,130 men

There were 9,808 men in the seven park brigades.

b) Reserve forces. It was laid down that permanent peacetime cadres were to be maintained for forming reserve [rezervnye] and replacement [zapasnye] units for the infantry. Each guards regiment had one replacement battalion, and each regiment of the Grenadier Corps and six infantry corps had two battalions - one reserve and one replacement. The cadre of each battalion consisted of 1 company-grade officer and 22 lower ranks. These cadres were stationed with the stores of uniforms and weapons for reserve and replacement battalions. They were to keep all the items being stored in good repair and use them to equip men on indefinite leave during their musters.

The first to be formed during the course of the war were fourth replacement battalions in the guards, fourth reserve battalions in the Grenadier Corps, and both a reserve and a replacement battalion in the regiments of the six infantry corps. Then in 1854, the number of reserve and replacement units was increased, namely: for each guards regiment three battalions were formed, called reserve (4th, 5th, and 6th), and from which 3-battalion reserve regiments were formed which made up three guards reserve divisions organized the same as active divisions. For each regiment of the Grenadier Corps and six infantry corps there were formed two reserve battalions (5th and 6th) (8) and two replacement (7th and 8th). The reserve and replacement battalions of each division were brought together in reserve and replacement brigades, each of eight battalions, while every four battalions were united into a regiment. Already in 1855 some reserve brigades were joined to active regiments, and in this way there were formed reserve and active 3-battalion regiments.

For rifle battalions there was first formed a reserve battalion, then another one, and in 1855 there were three reserve and two replacement battalions.

For sapper battalions there were formed: reserve half-battalions for the Guards and Grenadier Sapper Battalions, and two replacement sapper battalions for the rest. Besides this, in peacetime there were the 1st and 2nd Reserve Sapper Battalions, which upon being separated from their pontoon companies were each organized as four sapper companies.

For forming reserve and replacement units in the cavalry, there were in peacetime: seventh replacement squadrons with guards cavalry regiments, and ninth reserve squadrons in each regiment of the first six cavalry divisions, these last being combined into a separate reserve light cavalry division made up of four composite regiments.

With the placing of the forces on a war footing, there were first formed for each regiment a reserve squadron and a replacement squadron, but for each dragoon regiment - two reserve squadrons and one replacement.

For the reserve and replacement squadrons of the 1st and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions, 1st and 2nd Dragoon Divisions, the Reserve Lancer Division, and the single horse-pioneer double-squadron, permanent cadres of ten men were maintained at these units’ storehouses of weapons and uniforms.

The reserve and replacement squadrons of each cavalry division were joined together into a reserve brigade which upon first being formed consisted of eight squadrons.

During the Eastern War, a combined guards cavalry corps was formed from the reserve and replacement squadrons of the guards cavalry and Grenadier Corps, which consisted of seven 4-squadron regiments.

Permanent reserves served to form reserve and replacement units for the artillery, and also to train men on indefinite leave during their peacetime musters.

For guards foot artillery there was one platoon for each reserve and replacement battery, making six platoons in all.

For the foot artillery in the Grenadier Corps, there was one sub-unit division [divizion] for each of three reserve batteries, three replacement batteries, and three active batteries that had been stood down in peacetime. This made nine divisions in all or three combined grenadier batteries.

For the foot artillery of the six infantry corps, there was one platoon for each of the three reserve and three replacement batteries in every artillery division, making a total of 36 platoons which formed six combined reserve batteries.

For the horse artillery there was maintained one half-battery for each reserve battery of the first six horse-artillery brigades. For the rest, and for guards horse artillery, no cadres were kept during peacetime.

During the Eastern War there were formed from these reserve cadres:

For each active brigade - a reserve brigade, consisting of three batteries organized the same as active ones.

In 1855, in order to better provide replacements for both active and reserve batteries alike in the field foot artillery, there were formed fifth replacement platoons in every battery, each with a full complement of personnel for two guns and a half-complement of horses (9).

The bringing of the entire active force to wartime strength (10) and the formation of reserve and replacement units was done by recalling lower ranks on indefinite leave, who in this manner were the active army’s real reserve. In order to judge to what extent this reserve was sufficient to quickly bring the army up to wartime strength, it is necessary to describe the system of indefinite leave which existed at that time.

The length of service for lower ranks before retirement was set at 25 years for the army and 22 for the guards (11).

After 15 years of faultless service, the right of indefinite leave was allowed to all combatant personnel in general but only some non-combatant lower ranks (12).

Musicians and lower ranks who were Jews or the children of soldiers could obtain indefinite leave after serving for 20 years.

The men released on indefinite leave after serving 15 years had to muster every year for training for one month (around 1 September) at places designated by the Inspection Department. Men on indefinite leave who had served for 20 years were freed from these musters.

On examining this system, which had been introduced in Russia in 1834, we see that it could not provide the necessary number of men needed to bring the army up to a wartime footing. If we take the size of the active army as 494,000, which is the number presented above, and subtract 46,000, which is the decrease in numbers under the peacetime manning tables, we get 448,000 as the regulation number of combatant personnel in the active forces during peacetime (13).

With the release on indefinite leave of men after 15 years, and of some after 20, one may say that on the average about 2/3 of the soldiers were on active service and 1/3 were either on leave or in the reserves. It follows that the reserves could not be any larger that 1/3 of the total army strength, which is to say about 150,000.

This number, though, is still too large. Firstly, one cannot suppose that all soldiers who had served for 15 years (or some for 20) would be fit to continue combatant service. Secondly, some men died before serving out the their whole term of indefinite leave. And thirdly, many men lost the right to indefinite leave when they were transferred to non-combatant duties due to poor health, etc. Thus, the maximum number of able-bodied men on indefinite leave can hardly be reckoned at more than 135,000. Of this number, 46,000 had to go to enable the active forces to reach their prescribed wartime strength, which means that about 90,000 were left to form reserve and replacement units.

It is for these reasons, as seen from the data presented above on the number of reserve and replacement units formed during the war, that it was only at the end of 1854 that the numbers of reserve infantry were brought up to a level equal to that of the active infantry, while the cavalry and artillery were barely brought up to half the strength of their active counterparts.

Faced with the shortage of men on indefinite leave, the government had to resort to intensified recruit levies, namely: 1) 10th limited recruit levy, as declared in a manifesto of 15 July, 1852, calling up 7 out of 1000 men in the western half of the empire; 2) 8 July, 1853, in the eastern half of the empire, calling up 10 out of 1000 men; 3) 29 January, 1854, from the western half of the empire, calling up 9 out of 1000 men; 4) 27 April, 1854, calling up 10 out of 1000 men in the eastern half of the empire; 5) 26 August, 1854, calling up 10 out of 1000 men in the western half of the empire; 6) 1 December, 1854, calling up 10 out of 1000 men in the eastern half of the empire. Thus, there were six above-average recruit levies in two-and-a-half years. The total number of recruits called up during the Eastern War was 765,374.

Besides this, an order of the Minister of War on 15 March, 1854, announced an invitation to retired lower ranks to once again enter service, accompanied by various perquisites.

From everything written above, it can be said that the system of indefinite leave had the following disadvantages: 1) the reserve was quite insufficient and therefore the formation of the reserve army progressed very slowly; 2) the government had to resort to too many intensified levies from each of the halves of the empire, which was too great a burden for the country; and 3) the forces were made up of young people who had not managed to become sufficiently familiar with military service and army life, but rather went straight into the trials and deprivations of a campaign, which could only increase the numbers of sick and dead in the army.


c.) In addition to the regular forces, both active and reserve (which could be brought to a strength equal to that of the active component), the Russian army was reinforced with irregular forces.

The irregular forces that were directly a part of the active army that is our subject, were:

1) Don Cossack Host. This consisted of 2 guards cossack regiments, each of six active squadrons, 54 regiments (each divided into six sotnias), 1 guard battery and 9 active batteries (similar in organization to regular light horse batteries), and 4 reserve horse batteries. These units were made up of inhabitants of the lands of the Don Host aged 20 to 45 years. In peacetime, a certain number of field regiments and batteries, depending on need, were ordered to serve in Finland, the Active Army, the Caucasus, Bessarabia, and the Crimea. For each of the two guards regiments, the Life-Guards Cossacks and the Life-Guards Ataman’s, one double-squadron [divizion] each was with the Guards Corps. The other regiments, double-squadrons, and batteries were in the Don region exempt from service, but had to relieve the units on service every three years (every two years for the guards). In wartime, regiments and batteries were called into service as needed, without limit. If all the prescribed regiments had been sent forth, then anyone capable of bearing arms could be called into service.

In this manner during the Eastern War, by 1 January, 1855, there were some 70 serving regiments, and in 1855 there were more than 80. In wartime, regiments remained in service without relief and were only disbanded at the end of the war.

2) Danube Cossack Host. This consisted of two horse regiments settled in Bessarabia.

During the Eastern War, in addition to these cossacks, each two dragoon regiments had with them a regiment from the Ural Cossack Host.

By regulation, each cossack regiment had 850 lower ranks.

In this way, when the army was brought up to wartime strength and enough reserve units were formed so as to be equal in numbers to the active ones, then the prescribed size of the army was as follows:

Active army - 494,000 men: Infantry - 378,000 men.

Cavalry - 75,380 men.

Artillery - 31,130 men.

Sappers - 10,000 men.


To this is added the same number of reserves, Don cossacks, and over 40,000 New Russian cossacks. It follows that the army could be brought to over 1,000,000 men according to regulation manning tables, and to 800,000 or 900,000 by actual men present.


Officers of the Russian army were obtained from the following sources:

1) Officers graduated from cadet corps.

2) Promotion, based on examination, of volunteer nobles and volunteers of four defined classes. This would be after they had served from two to twelve years, depending on their origins.

3) Promotion of combatant non-commissioned officers without any preferential social standing, after serving either ten years in the guards or twelve years in the army, and after passing a prescribed examination.

Artillery and engineer schools served to prepare officers for the specialized arms of service, but in addition, sapper battalions and the artillery received officers graduated from the cadet corps.

To provide officers with higher military education there were: the Military Academy (now the Nicholas General-Staff Academy), whose officers who finished the course were designated for service in the General Staff; officers’ classes in the engineer school (now the Nicholas Engineer Academy); officers’ classes in the artillery school (now the Michael Artillery Academy).




Infantry, except for rifle battalions (which formed two ranks), were deployed in three ranks. Of the four companies in each battalion, one was a grenadier or carabinier company which in open order [razvernutnyi stroi] was divided into two halves: the first half - the grenadier platoon - stood on the battalion’s right flank, while the second half - the rifle platoon - was on the left flank. Infantry was armed with smoothbore percussion muskets. Rifle battalions had rifled 7-line [0.70 caliber] Liège "shtutser" weapons. In each infantry battalion there were 2 non-commissioned officers and 24 privates armed with these shtutser rifles, and they were called shtutsernye [riflemen] (14).

For fortification work, each infantry company had 20 axes, 10 shovels, 5 picks, and 5 mattocks. The men in the rear rank took turns carrying these on campaign. In each sapper battalion the men carried 410 axes, 290 shovels, 80 picks, and 40 mattocks, and an additional 866 entrenching tools were carried in the wagon train of every sapper battalion.

The infantry principal maneuvers consisted of an extraordinary variety of close-order formations. Columns were formed by tactical division, platoon, and half-platoon; at full interval, close interval of sub-units for the attack column, or at half interval. Columns could be formed one kind from the other. All of these columns could form into a square, of which there were almost as many kinds as there were columns. Skirmish order [razsypnoi stroi] was much less complicated and thus less practiced. Exercises were always done on level ground, and there was no practice in using terrain. Target practice, except for rifle battalions, was neglected. Firing was mostly with blanks and with drill movements. It was not uncommon to meet an infantry soldier who served several years in his regiment without firing a single actual musket ball. And those soldier who managed to fire for real did so very little, since only ten cartridges with balls were issued annually to each soldier in infantry and dragoon regiments. It was only by an army order of 5 April, 1853, that five more rounds were added to this number. But not even all of these ten cartridges might find their way to the soldier, since unit commanders figured that a man could not be taught how to shoot with only ten rounds a year, and they concentrated on target practice only for riflemen, of which there were 48 in each battalion. Therefore their training used more than the issue number of cartridges, at the expense of the other soldiers. All aspects of training which served to develop a soldier’s agility, such as gymnastics and fencing, were at this time considered superfluous.

Cavalry and artillery regulations were less complicated. Cavalry formed up in two ranks.

All cuirassiers were armed with broadswords [palashi], and the first rank with lances. Officers and non-commissioned officers had pistols. Dragoons had shashka swords and muskets with bayonets. Lancers had sabers [sabli], lances, and carbines, and hussars were armed the same as lancers but without lances. Flank files in the platoons of all branches of the cavalry had cavalry shtutser rifles.

Foot artillerymen were armed with the short sword [tesak], while horse artillerymen had the shashka and a pistol.

Practice in firing at targets in the artillery was at an satisfactory level.

Joint maneuvers of infantry with artillery, and of cavalry with horse artillery, were under prescribed and immutable norms which deprived the commander of any initiative and which were mainly suited for level terrain.

For infantry with artillery there were five formations, and for cavalry with artillery - four.

The headquarters of the commander of the 4th and 5th Infantry Corps prepared special instructions for operations against the Turks. These were titled Instructions for Battle Against Turks, and were approved by Highest Authority on 20 July, 1853. Copies were sent to all column commanders.

The basis of these instructions were rules observed by Prince Paskevich in his wars against the Persians and Turks. The main idea underlying all these rules was the desire to give all military formations the greatest possible cohesiveness and mass, in order to withstand the Turkish cavalry’s headlong and disordered attacks and the infantry’s huge, unorganized masses, which always moved forward to envelop the attacked units from both sides. To achieve this, our side avoided movements in open order as much as possible. Even on ground that was uneven or covered with tall bushes, we covered a solid front not with a skirmish line, but with rifle platoons drawn up in close formation or with company columns. Riflemen were sent out in open order only in the mostly heavily wooded terrain. The cavalry was likewise not permitted to send out flankers, whose place was taken by close-order platoons or half-squadrons.

Detailed rules were laid out for the movement of separate groups of forces and their battlefield deployment, dependent on the number of battalions and batteries in the force. It was laid down as an inviolable rule that any battlefield deployment was to be in three lines with stipulated distances between them.

The various ways the Turks could attack a battlefield formation were enumerated and detailed directions were provided on how to repel these attacks.

In a word, in the directions for fighting the Turks we see the same tendency as in all regulations of that time: to lay out the largest possible number of standard procedures for all possible situations.

Without going into a detailed analysis of all the rules laid out in these directives, I will cite a few of these instructions:

§12. When a force has cavalry with its infantry, then it is to have the cavalry in the space between the second line and the reserve, in double-squadron columns, and the horse artillery with the artillery reserve (i.e., in the third line).

§21. When using musket fire, the most important thing is for all the men to aim at the waist; in this the officers are to strictly observe that no one fires upward, etc.

From these two paragraphs it can be seen how the capabilities and purposes of cavalry were understood at that time, and to what extent the infantry were training in shooting.

Forward patrols and piquets were duties mostly carried out by cossacks, and in this case Don cossacks were an excellent force the like of which did not exist in any other European army.

Discipline was based on strictly carrying out all prescribed service requirements and all orders and directives of commanders. This was ingrained in all military personnel, and we do not encouter any violations.

The defense of Sevastopol fully demonstrated the spirit of the Russian troops. It is an inseparable characteristic of the Russian soldier in all wars to carry out difficult labors, bear deprivations, and disregard dangers, and these are characteristics which have remained with him in our own times.



1) Grenadier, carabineer, infantry, and jäger regiments, as well as grenadier, carabineer, fusilier, jäger, and musketeer companies, did not have any practical differences between them.

2) By an order of Minister of War on 21 October, 1854, army rifle battalions were brought to a 1000-man strength.

3) Order of the Minister of War, 2 March, 1854.

4) Order of the Minister of War, 8 March, 1854.

5) By an order of the Minister or War on 3 April, 1855, all light guards foot batteries and the junior light batteries in each of the field artillery brigades were replaced by lightened 12-pounder batteries.

By and order of the Minister of War on 12 July, 1855, in place of the four 12-gun batteries in each field artillery brigade, there were to be formed five 8-gun batteries: two heavy and three light.

6) With batteries of 12 lightened guns.

7) Including the fifth light batteries formed at the beginning of 1854.

8) By an order of the Minister of War dated 17 March, 1854, the fourth reserve battalions previously formed for regiments of the Grenadier Corps were renamed as fourth active battalions.

9) Order of the Minister of War, 2 July, 1855.

10) Peacetime strengths were less than wartime by the following proportions: in guards and grenadier infantry regiments - 500 men less; in regiments of the six infantry corps - 400 men; in guards cavalry regiments - 120 men; in the regiments of light cavalry divisions - 80 men; in cuirassier regiments - 70 men; and in dragoon regiments - 130 men.

11) Collection of Military Regulations, Part II, Book I, 1838 ed., pgs. 1403-1578.

12) Ibid., pgs. 1204-1317; Orders of the Minister of War for 1851, No. 80, and 1852, No. 48, and the opinion of the Military Council, confirmed by Highest Authority in March of 1851.

13) This is an approximate calculation and one must note that the actual strength of the army was very different from the prescribed number.

14) These men formed up in the rear line of non-commissioned officers, three behind each platoon. They were called out into a skirmish line at a special signal. In addition to them, there were also 24 replacement riflemen in a battalion, trained to fire the shtutser but not equipped with one. They were numbered along with the ordinary majority of the unit’s soldiers.


Translated by Mark Conrad, 1994.