TECHNICAL REPORT FROM THE 10th TANK DIVISION, AUGUST 1941

[The original Russian transcript came to me from Mr. Charles Sharp. It is a report signed by the commander of the 10th Tank Division, dated 2 August 1941.)

III. Equipment Performance

During the fighting every vehicle accrued at least 135 engine hours, and from 22 June through 9 July 1941 wheeled vehicles traveled approximately 300 km. From the beginning of combat operations until 2-3 July each combat vehicle was operating an average of 10 to 13 hours each day, and during this time the situation was such that there was no opportunity to carry out the appropriate mechanical inspections, which could not but affect vehicular performance. The operating conditions for the vehicles were unbelievably severe. The terrain itself where the tanks were operating was broken, marshy in some places and sandy in others. Most of the bridges were able to support light vehicles. Vehicular loads were excessive since missions, as a rule, were drawn up without considering the mechanical state of the machines. Movements were sometimes up to 200 km a day—for example, those to Volochissk, Proskurov, and the Ulanov area (Petrikovtsy).

IV. Characteristics of the KV and T-34 Tanks

KV and T-34 tanks basically possessed high combat qualities: strong armor and good armament. On the battlefield KV tanks smashed enemy armor and in every instance their tanks retreated.

The division’s soldiers and commanders spoke of their tanks as very reliable machines. But along with these qualities they had the following defects:

1) For the KV tanks:

a) Under the impact of shells and large-caliber bullets, the turret ring and armored cupolas can jam.

b) The diesel engine has little reserve power, resulting in it being overloaded and overheating.

c) The main and side clutches break down.

2. For the T-34:

a) Hull armor is penetrated at 300 to 400 meters by a 37-mm antitank round. Side armor is penetrated by a 20-mm antitank round. When crossing ditches the low set of the vehicle causes its nose to dig in, and traction with the ground is insufficient due to the relative smoothness of the tracks.

b) With a direct hit by a shell the driver’s front hatch collapses.

c) The vehicle’s treads are weak—any round takes them off.

d) The main and side clutches break down.

All defects of the KV and T-34 tanks, along with recommendations, were reported in detail to the chief of the Main Automotive-Armored-Tank Directorate [nachalnik Glavnago avtobronetankovogo upravleniya], Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Fedorenko, and the chief of the Automotive-Armored-Tank Directorate of the Southwest Front, Major General of Tank Troops Morgunov.

V. Repair and recovery of vehicles and the supply of replacement parts

The supply of replacement parts before combat operations was extremely poor, especially for wheeled vehicles,. The district automotive-armored-tank directorate demanded monthly requests for these, but the percentage that was filled was insignificant.

Such a situation with replacement parts had an immediate ruinous effect during combat operations. Vehicles frequently went out of service due to the smallest mechanical defects.

Before the beginning of military operations the division had a very limited number of replacement parts for combat vehicles and none at all for wheeled transport. There was likewise no stockage of spare parts in the division’s "NZ" (1).

During military operations the division received replacement parts (and then in very limited quantities) only when divisional units withdrew to Volochissk.

The division obtained tires for trucks on its own initiative on 29.7.41 by sending ten vehicles to the Automotive-Armored-Tank Directorate of the Kharkov Military District.

Lacking replacement parts during the first phase of military operations, units of the 10th Tank Division were forced to make repairs at the expense of vehicles put out of service by more serious breakdowns.

In spite of the difficult situation in regard to spare parts, repairs and restorations of vehicles did not go badly. Usually, under combat conditions vehicle repairs should be done on an assembly-line basis; we, however, worked piecemeal, which significantly lengthened the time before a machine was back from being repaired.

During combat operations the division’s repair resources accomplished the following:

Limited repair capabilities, especially of type-B skills, put this in a difficult situation. In all the division there were only five master mechanics. There was an especially noticeable shortage of men skilled in repairing engines, vulcanizing tires, electric welding, and mechanical work.

The repair and restoration battalion [remontno-vosstanovitelnyi batalion] began its direct work only since 25.6.41, as before that time it was kept back for the defense of Zolochev, on the orders of the corps commander.

The recovery of combat vehicles from the battlefield was done exclusively by tanks, under difficult circumstances and under the protection of battleworthy vehicles. An operational KV tank, towing a damaged tank and not having spare power, often broke down itself.

Many times a vehicle’s crew along with the repair crew sent to help them, not wanting to abandon the machine, were fixing it in direct proximity to the enemy, and when their unit withdrew they themselves were surrounded. The fate of a whole number of such personnel is still not known at this time.

The absence of corps and army collection points for damaged vehicles complicated the work of evacuating combat and transport vehicles, and the division’s resources could not deal with this task under the conditions of a general retreat. Under such circumstances the number of Voroshilovets tractors held by the division was plainly insufficient.

At the crossings near Toporuv 12 or 13 tractors were sent to evacuate damaged combat vehicles but some of these did not return.

VI. Equipment losses

 

			Number of losses by kind of vehicle
No	Nature of loss		KV	T-34	T-28	BT-7	T-26	Armrd. cars.	Total
1	Hit and burned up on the battlefield		11	20	4	53	7	13	108
2	Broke down while carrying out a combat mission and remained in territory occupied by the enemy		—	1	4	2	2	4	13
3	Vehicle and crew did not return from the battlefield after an attack		11	3	—	3	3	7	27
4	Burned up as a result of air bombardment		—	—	—	1	—	4	5
5	Vehicle and crew left surrounded by the enemy because of a mechanical failure or lack of fuel or lubricants		2	—	6	1	—	—	9
6	Abandoned due to lack of fuel or lubricants and the inability to supply them, since the area in which the vehicles were located was captured by the enemy		—	—	4	2	—	—	6
7	Missing with crew, fate unknown		—	—	3	—	—	—	3
8	Destroyed at collection points for damaged vehicles due to the inability to evacuate them when retreating		7	1	6	—	—	6	20
9	Abandoned during a unit’s retreat due to mechanical failures and the inability to repair or evacuate them		22	6	15	28	10	14	95
10	Stuck in bad terrain and impossible to extract and evacuate them		3	1	2	10	2	3	21
		Total . . . . . . .	56	32	44	100	24	51	307

Of the 800 wheeled vehicles brought into the campaign there were lost: 210 in combat; 34 due to mechanical failures or lack of fuel and lubricants and then left behind with their drivers and surrounded by the enemy; 2 destroyed at a collection point for damaged machines when they could not be evacuated during the general retreat; 6 vehicles were stuck in bad terrain and impossible to evacuate; and 41 were abandoned during their units’ retreat due to mechanical failures and the impossibility of repairing them.

So from these figures, of 307 combat vehicles the division lost 153, or 50%, on the battlefield the; stuck in bad terrain—21, or 7%; destroyed at collection points for damaged vehicles—20, or 7%; and lost due to mechanical failures and the inability to repair or evacuate them—95, or 31%.

Thus, almost half of the combat vehicles were put out of service as a direct result of combat, but the greater part of the second half were lost due to mechanical failures during the division’s retreat or destroyed at collection points for damaged machines.

95 combat vehicles and 41 wheeled vehicles were lost in close proximity to the enemy during the division’s general withdrawal; additionally, the lack of a sufficient number of tractors and the absence of corps and army collection points for damaged vehicles made it impossible to deal with this task.

Evacuating these vehicles by railroad was likewise impossible since the 3rd Section (2) of the Southwest Front did not give orders to station masters and commandants to provide flatcars, and attempts to send vehicles by rail did not meet with any success.

Example. Captain Bormotov, a repair engineer [inzhener po remontu], tried to send a damaged vehicle from Krasnoye, but the station master refused to do so, pointing out the absence of orders on the part of the Southwest Front’s 3rd Section.

The lack of sufficient quantities of spare parts also contributed to increasing losses due to mechanical failures.

Besides the losses entered in the table under mechanical failures, there were left waiting for medium and capital repairs at the tank regiments’ redeployment location in Zolochev: T-34—1 machine; T-28’s—7; BT-7’s—34; and T-27’s—40.

These vehicles were also not evacuated for the reasons indicated above.

Reports and summaries were drawn up for all the division’s vehicle losses and sent through the 15th Mechanized Corps to the Auto-Armored-Tank Directorate of the Southwest Front.

Later there were sent back to the production factories: KV’s—7 vehicles, T-34’s—2, BT-7’s—20, and T-26’s—5.

VII. Vehicles on hand as of 2.8.41

After being withdrawn to the front’s reserve for rebuilding, and after sending some vehicles off to be repaired and transferring another lot to other units, the division can deploy:

According to the division’s new equipment tables:

With the authorized number of tanker trucks [avtotsisterny] it is impossible to provide the normal supply of fuels and lubricants, and with three type-B repair trucks [masterskie tipa "B"] the normal workload for repairing vehicles cannot be maintained.

The vehicles being provided are not those needed. For example, the artillery regiment is authorized to have 34 STZ-5 tractors, but it is being equipped with ChTZ-65 and STZ-3 tractors which according to their technical specifications (slow speed) are not able to keep the artillery regiment moving as fast as the other units in the division.

An artillery regiment equipped with ChTZ-65 and STZ-3 tractors cannot operate as part of a tank division, but perhaps can only be used as an independent unit.

From that which has been laid out above, it follows that:

1. The division had a sufficient quantity of vehicles to carry out its established combat mission. The mechanical state of all vehicles, except for some of the BT-7’s and T-28’s, was good.

2. There was not a sufficient quantity of trucks (by tonnage), which led to leaving some loads in place and later to their loss.

3. The prescribed vehicles from the civilian sector, as foreseen by mobilization plans, did not arrive at the division, which compounded transport difficulties.

4. In the situation that developed (the withdrawal of all the division’s units) the Voroshilovets tractors on hand turned out to be insufficient.

5. The provision of replacement parts before combat operations, as well as during them, was not organized, and often this was the reason for taking individual vehicles apart for spares.

6. There was a very limited quantity of repair resources in the division, and as of this date it only has 3 type-B repair trucks.

7. The evacuation of vehicles from the battlefield was only done with combat vehicles and under very difficult conditions. During the general retreat of the units the evacuation of damaged vehicles was done with tractors and combat vehicles in close proximity to the enemy.

8. Collection points for damaged vehicles (at corps and army level) were not organized, which led to excessive losses of combat vehicles.

9. The division suffered many vehicle losses, of which the significant portion of those caused by mechanical failures occurred that during the units’ general retreat when it was impossible to evacuate them. Individual machines (about four) were abandoned by their drivers in a condition which did not require leaving the vehicles (two men were court-martialed).

I consider it necessary to carry out the following measures:

1. Issue orders to the factories making KV and T-34 tanks to eliminate the present defects of these machines.

2. Improve the supply of replacement parts so that it does not come to restoring some vehicles at the expense of others.

3. Bring the division up to strength in tankers and type-B repair trucks.

4. Consider it mandatory to organize army-level collection points for damaged vehicles, since otherwise the division with its resources cannot meet the task of evacuating vehicles to the production factories.

5. Consider it desirous to organize special army and truck battalions for delivering fuel, lubricants, and spare parts directly to the division’s rear.

6. The production factories must be given the task of building armored tanker trucks with caterpillar treads and with powerful pumping capabilities (such a tanker could be used as a tractor for evacuating inoperational tanks from the battlefield).

General conclusions and suggestions

Under difficult conditions the division carried out a series of critical combat missions, gained much combat experience, developed a significant cadre of active soldiers, and rallied even more closely around the party of Lenin. Personnel have increased their readiness and courage to fight the enemy to the last drop of blood until he is completely destroyed.

When the division is again sent into battle all this will allow our blows against the enemy hordes to have even more effective results.

Along with this, during the course of accomplishing our combat tasks there were a number of serious deficiencies and individual mistakes, and from the moment they were withdrawn to the front’s reserve all the personnel in the division were working on, and continue to work on, complete explanations for these and the extraction of lessons for future battles.

With the goal of improving the combat capability of the division, I suggest:

1. Include a rifle company in trucks as part of the reconnaissance battalion as a necessary reinforcement for the reconnaissance elements sent out from the battalion.

2. Include one rifle company and a motorcycle platoon as part of a tank regiment.

3. Introduce into the division’s equipment table a flight [zveno] of planes for liason, artillery control, and close reconnaissance.

4. Withdraw small-capacity vehicles (GAZ-AA) from tank divisions and equip them with machines with that carry more tonnage.

5. Increase the number of tanks in the division’s headquarters, since in practice absolute necessity leads to taking tanks from units in any case, often weakening them.

6. Reestablish tank reserve companies [roty tankovogo rezerva].

7. Have a set of explosives in each tank.

8. Increase the anti-aircraft (4) resources in the rear units.

In regard to the employment of tanks in general and tank divisions in particular, I believe that ignoring official regulations and commonly known requirements when planning a mission using tanks brings nothing but disasterous losses.

 

Acting commander of the 10th Tank Division, Lieutenant Colonel SUKHORUCHKIN

Military Commissar of the 10th Tank Division, Regimental Commissar GREZNEV

[2.8.41] (5)

F. 229, op. 3780ss, d. 6, pp. 196-218.

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Notes:

(1) Neprikosnovennyi zapas [emergency reserve].

(2) 3-i otdel; sic. [Footnote in original.]

(3) Sic.-translator.

(4) In the original document—"anti anti-aircraft," [protivozenitnyi instead of just zenitnyi]. [Footnote in original.]

(5) Date based on accompanying correspondence. [Footnote in original.]

Translated by Mark Conrad, 1995.